Middle East Politics and International Relations by Shahram Akbarzadeh Kylie Baxter & Baxter Kylie

Author:Shahram Akbarzadeh,Kylie Baxter & Baxter, Kylie
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Taylor & Francis (CAM)

The Suez War

In October 1956, a combined force from Israel, France and the United Kingdom captured the Egyptian-controlled Suez Canal that links the Mediterranean to the Red Sea. This operation took the rest of the world by surprise – most significantly, the United States – and it heralded the latter’s arrival as the new superpower in the region.

The crisis was tied to the policies of the charismatic Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and his posturing in relation to the United Kingdom. Nasser had come to power in 1953. In line with other post-colonial initiatives of the time, he was seeking to industrialize the Egyptian state, and his major project was the construction of the Aswan Dam. Nasser approached the United Kingdom and the United States for funding and received assurances of a US$250-million loan. But then Washington formally withdrew its offer of funding on 19 July 1956 and the World Bank followed suit four days later (Ricker 2001: 67), primarily in response to Nasser’s recent overtures to the Soviet Union. The Egyptian President, now lacking the money he needed to complete his project, took the controversial step of nationalizing the Suez Canal. This waterway, built by Egyptian labour in the 1860s, had historically been under the control of a French and English consortium – the Suez Canal Company. Nasser’s decision to nationalize it had two serious consequences: it deprived France and the United Kingdom of revenue and Israel of access to the Red Sea. This infuriated the colonial powers and led to the formation of an alliance of convenience. A secret tripartite operation, codenamed Operation Musketeer, was formulated by Israel, France and the United Kingdom, and their combined military force captured the canal on 29 October 1956.

Although the assault was a military success, it was a political disaster for the allied forces. Widespread protests in the Arab world were expected, but fierce condemnation from both the Soviet Union and the United States was not (Choueiri 2000: 185–186). The depth of Washington’s anger was evident in its decision to call for ‘collective military, economic and financial sanctions’ against Israel unless it withdrew (Bar-Siman-Tov 1987: 54). This call was blocked in the United Nations Security Council by the dual veto of Israel’s allies in the conflict – France and the United Kingdom. Underscoring the dynamics of the international system at the time, Washington quickly abandoned this tactic, as sanctions against Israel suggested the need for sanctions against Britain and France, too. In the Cold War context, Washington could not afford to penalize its own closest allies in that way.

The tension triggered by the conflict ratcheted up as the Soviets threatened retaliatory attacks on London and Paris, and Washington brought significant political and economic pressure to bear on the United Kingdom, including a threat to withhold vital support for the British currency (McNamara 2003: 59). Eventually, the allies were forced to withdraw in a debacle that contributed to the resignation of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden. By its conclusion in March 1957, between 2,500 and 3,500 people had died in the conflict, most of them Egyptians.

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